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Abstract. Inclusion in education and upbringing is understood as belonging, as the opposite of 
exclusion. How do people with cognitive and physical impairments learn, and how do they acquire 
knowledge? Access to schools and other institutions of learning is not the same as access to 
knowledge. In addition, opportunities for learning and the imparting and grasping of knowledge differ 
from person to person. Nobody can be included everywhere or demand unqualified access. It would be 
desirable but it is not always possible to be able to determine where and how one is to be included. 
In cases of limited autonomy there has to be a kind of selection and control of knowledge. This 
means the young and the cognitively impaired do not have unconstrained access to knowledge. 
Educators and parents are responsible for selecting and controlling knowledge for the young and the 
cognitively impaired. How this can be done justly? How ought one to deal with the knowledge claims 
and the epistemic and cognitive abilities of those with relevant deficiencies? Under what 
circumstances can one speak of knowledge here? And what would be the basis for inclusion within a 
knowledge community? 
Keywords: Context-sensitive realism; epistemological access; epistemic justice, epistemic 
paternalism, inclusive education, social epistemology. 
1    Introduction: Justice, Integration and Inclusion 
John Rawls’s theory has probably been the most influential contribution to the discussion of justice 
during the last 50 years. Rawls has argued that the limited scope of ‘justice as fairness’ and of equality 
can be accounted for in terms of a hypothetical contract. This contract is struck by self-interested 
beings in what Rawls calls ‘the original position’ under the ‘veil of ignorance’. Ignorant of what their 
future life, prospects and capacities, and so on, will be, they select principles of justice to ensure for 
them fair and equal consideration and treatment (Rawls, 1971). Rawls is aware of the fact that his 
theory  
fails to embrace all moral relationships, since it would seem to include only our relation with 
other persons and to leave out of account how we are to conduct ourselves towards animals and 
the rest of nature. I do not contend that the contract notion offers a way to approach these 
questions which are certainly of the first importance, and I shall have to put them aside. (Rawls, 
1971: 17)  
If these questions are really of prime importance, one might argue that any theory that fails to give 
them due consideration must either be abandoned or amended. Alternatively, one might examine the 
reasons for excluding animals from considerations of justice and equality, assess their validity, and 
inquire into the theory’s (undesirable) implications. One of these is that it excludes all those who are 
unable, for whatever reasons, to enter into contractual agreements and arrangements, i.e. (amongst 
others) individuals with disabilities and foreign nationals who have escaped illiberal, oppressive and life-
threatening situations at home (see also Gutmann, 2009). Any theory that links considerations of justice 
(and indeed of morality) too tightly with considerations of mutual advantage within the nation-state as 
the basic unit of analysis is likely to exclude not only nonhuman animals and people with mental and 
physical handicaps but also those who happen to originate in a place outside of the specific nation-state 
or supranational configuration of states. ‘Today’, Martha Nussbaum notes, 
when the issue of justice for people with disabilities is prominent on the agenda of every decent 
society, the omission of all of them from participation in the situation of basic political choice 
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 looks problematic, given the evident capacity of many if not most of them for choice; and their 
omission from the group of persons for whom society’s most basic principles are chosen is more 
problematic still. Even if their interests can be taken into account derivatively or at a later stage, 
we naturally wonder why this postponement is necessary, and whether it is not likely to affect the 
fully equal treatment of such citizens – even if it is not in and of itself a form of unequal 
treatment. (Nussbaum, 2006: 18)  
Rawls acknowledges that these are problems for his contractarian position and that ‘justice as fairness 
may fail’ with regard to the consideration and treatment of those with disabilities and those who are not 
members of the species Homo sapiens (Rawls, 1996: 21). Much of his later work is devoted to attempts 
to address the problem for contractarianism constituted by foreign nationals, which he deems solvable 
(see also Nussbaum 2006: 3). 
The ideas of inclusion and nonexclusion have received sporadic attention in post-Rawlsian social and 
educational philosophy. In response to Rawls’s approach, Nussbaum has called for a theory of justice 
that offers a more inclusive account of social cooperation, one that values the diverse capabilities of 
individuals. She builds on Rawls’s work, in order to explore the ramifications of a theory of justice for 
the mentally and physically disabled, foreign nationals, and nonhuman animals. 
One of the basic principles in Amy Gutmann’s theory of democratic education is the principle of 
nonexclusion: 
In its application to primary schooling, whose social purpose is to develop democratic character in 
all its citizens, the principle of nondiscrimination becomes a principle of nonexclusion: no educable 
child may be excluded from an education adequate to participating in the processes that structure 
choice among good lives. Stated so abstractly, the principle of nonexclusion provides a necessary 
but not a sufficient standard of democratic distribution with regard to primary schooling. 
(Gutmann, 1987: 127) 
The ideas of integration and inclusion have gained additional currency with the refugee situation 
presently challenging Europe and the EU. In what ways, if any, is inclusion different from integration? 
Inclusion is commonly understood as a reform programme for deep-seated and far-reaching 
transformation of society as a whole and, in particular, of the school system as such, whereas integration 
refers to the incorporation or absorption of certain groups of people into society and, in particular, of 
certain groups of learners into the existing school system, which remains essentially untransformed (see 
Stojanov, 2015: 3). It should be clear that both integration and inclusion apply, in principle, to the 
accommodation both of foreign nationals (and refugees) and of impaired persons. The current concern in 
many European countries is whether an inclusive (as contrasted with integrative) approach to the 
refugee challenge would not involve some kind of abandonment (or disintegration) of national identity 
and constitute a threat to the social fabric as a whole. (Indeed, there appears to be a tendency to treat 
integration as the preferred process of dealing with refugees and inclusion as the more desirable way of 
accommodating persons with disability.) This problem, and its educational implications, surely merits 
thorough investigation – which this paper, however, will not seek to provide. Instead, I will focus on the 
demands imposed by the accommodation of those with disabilities and only occasionally refer to foreign 
nationals and refugees, by way of illustration and contrast. 
Further questions are: Does taking educational justice seriously entail inclusion or only integration? 
Could inclusion conceivably violate the norms of educational justice?1 To what extent, if any, do those 
with cognitive disabilities benefit from inclusive educational practices? And what, if anything, does 
inclusion offer those without relevant disabilities (Merz-Atalik, 2015; the notion of ‘relevant’ is 
significant here, because everyone has strengths, as well as weaknesses that arguably require some 
degree of attention2)? A quick response to the last question might be that, at the very least, those 
without pertinent handicaps are likely to develop a greater sensitivity towards those who are so disabled 
and to increase their ability to take a pro-active role in a world of difference, diversity and 
                                                 
1 In this regard, Krassimir Stojanov examines the different responses provided in terms of distributive justice, 
participatory justice and recognitory justice (Stojanov, 2015; see also Stojanov, 2011: 27-45). 
2 Nussbaum concurs: ‘… it would be progress of we could acknowledge that there really is no such thing as “the 
normal child”: instead, there are children, with varying capabilities and varying impediments, all of whom need 
individualized attention as their capabilities are developed’ (Nussbaum, 2006: 210). 
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 heterogeneity3. Nussbaum, referring to education and inclusion in particular, claims that the practice of 
‘mainstreaming’ children with disabilities  
can be defended on grounds of the benefit to the mentally disabled child, who will be given more 
incentives to develop cognitively and who may be less likely to be stigmatised as type apart. It 
can also be defended because of the benefit it offers to so-called normal children, who learn about 
humanity and its diversity by being in a classroom with a child who has unusual impairments. 
They learn to think for themselves, their own weaknesses, and the variety of human capability, in 
a new way … (Nussbaum 2006: 205-206) 
The ethical dimension of integration and inclusion is only one of several areas of possible philosophical 
investigation. My concern here is less with the ethical than with the epistemological dimension, which 
nonetheless retains a bearing on the question of educational justice. This article attempts to provide an 
analysis of the following three epistemological aspects4, with regard to the notion of inclusion and the 
conception of justice within education, in terms of both the connections and tensions between them: 
• epistemological access (Morrow, 2007; see also Lotz-Sisitka, 2009; Bekker, 2013, Walton, 2013, 
Walton and Bekker, 2013), 
• epistemic parentalism (following Goldman’s notion of epistemic paternalism; Goldman, 1992), 
and 
• epistemic justice (Fricker, 2007). 
2    Epistemological Access 
There is a tendency to associate inclusive education with learners with various kinds of disability, 
especially those with ‘special educational needs’ (Walton and Bekker, 2013: 442). This is a rather 
problematic label. As Elizabeth Walton and Tanya Bekker have explained, a learner diagnosed with 
cerebral palsy (which is commonly identified as a ‘special need’) may require considerably less help from 
her teacher than a young person who heads a household (which is not usually considered a ‘special need’; 
p. 458). Less narrowly conceived, however, inclusive education targets the various ways in which 
marginalisation and disadvantage, generally, occur in educational contexts and situations – in other 
words, all kinds of exclusion from those opportunities that ought to characterise access to learning. 
Amongst other things, inclusive pedagogy might be understood as providing learners with 
epistemological access. In other words, and importantly, inclusive education is ‘an issue of how 
epistemological access is enabled or constrained by the pedagogical choices we make’ (ibid.). ‘In 
inclusive education discourse’, according to Walton and Bekker, ‘“exclusion” is used to describe not only 
the physical non-presence of children, but also the variety of factors that impede full and fair access to 
and participation in school activities’: that is, ‘access to the curriculum, learning and teacher attention, 
access to peer and social interactions, … and access to school resources, extra-curricular activities and 
participation in school traditions’ (p. 450).  
The term ‘epistemological access’ was first coined by Wally Morrow (2009: iv), the late South African 
educational philosopher who played a significant role in post-apartheid educational reform. ‘Starting 
from the idea that teaching is conceptually linked to the idea of access’, Morrow argues that 
there are two kinds of access – formal and epistemological – not commonly distinguished from 
each other. Formal access is a matter of access to the institutions of learning, and it depends on 
factors such as admission rules, personal finances, and so on; epistemological access, on the other 
hand, is access to [the goods that institutions distribute to those it formally admits and, as the 
main good distributed by educational institutions, to] knowledge [which must be understood here 
as encompassing all kinds of practical and theoretical knowledge]. While formal access is 
important in the light of our history of unjustifiable institutional exclusions, epistemological 
access is what the game is about. One way of characterising teaching is to say that it is the 
practice of enabling epistemological access. (Morrow, 2007: 2; see also p. 8, note 6, and p. 39). 
                                                 
3 An interesting question in this regard is whether heterogeneity is merely a state in the absence of an ideal state 
(i.e. homogeneity) or whether it is desirable in and for itself. I owe this point to Joachim Thomas. 
4 To be more precise, these are ideas within the fairly new field of social epistemology, understood here as concerned 
with the interpersonal and social practices and norms that influence and guide the search for knowledge.  
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 It follows that the question, ‘Epistemological access for whom?’ (Walton and Bekker, 2013: 443), 
appears to receive the rather uninteresting answer, ‘Everyone who is educable’. But this by no means 
renders the concept superfluous. Given that education and classrooms, in particular, are increasingly 
characterised by diversity and heterogeneity of learners (commonly with vastly different features, 
competences, learning needs and learning barriers), it is clear that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach does not 
(any longer) meet current challenges (ibid.; see also Walton, 2013: 508). This will also have a bearing on 
the breadth and depth of the access in question. On the other hand, responsive educators also need to 
protect themselves from pedagogical paralysis. If the uniqueness of learners necessitates respectively 
unique teaching strategies, then an over-emphasis of the individual could soon lead to a culture of over-
emphasising difference. It could be argued that it is not so much a matter of diversity in general but 
rather of emphasis on pedagogically relevant differences, that is, of judging when and to what extent 
individual and group differences are pedagogically significant, of planning lessons that are meant to 
provide access for all, and so on. The quality of pedagogy, that is, how educators work with knowledge, 
can be seen either as promoting or as preventing access. Heila Lotz-Sisitka (2009), building on Morrow’s 
ideas and on the basis of several case studies, lists several ways in which teaching practice can constrain 
epistemological access: 
• through teacher’s failure to bridge the divide between the concrete and the abstract, or 
between everyday knowledge and school knowledge; 
• through teacher’s failure to interpret the demands of setting curricular standards and 
subsequent limitation of the scope and level of access in relation to these standards; 
• through reliance on teacher knowledge only, which may in itself be limited, and subsequent 
limitation of the scope and depth of access to new knowledge; and 
• through inadequate feedback on tasks, and subsequent failure to enable learners to deepen their 
understanding or address misconceptions (see also Walton & Bekker, 2013: 452).  
In the remainder of this section, I discuss three problems I have identified. First, it would appear that 
a substantial portion of the literature on inclusion understands epistemological access in constructivist 
terms, i.e. in terms of learners being ‘active participants in the construction of their knowledge’ (Bekker, 
2013: 467). Thus, Bekker writes: 
Knowledge is frequently presented as contested (in other words, it is not presented as a fixed 
body of information, but rather as being constructed; contrasting points of view or interpretations 
and potentially conflicting forms of knowledge are discussed) instead of as universally accepted by 
all (that is, as a one-dimensional body of truth).5 (p. 476) 
What is missing in the pertinent literature is an account, let alone a critical analysis, of the concept of 
knowledge. An examination of this idea may well demonstrate that the conceptualisation of 
constructivism as an epistemology (and perhaps even as a pedagogy and as a learning theory) is highly 
problematic6. The common assertion that knowledge is ‘contested’ seems to draw its strength entirely 
from this lack of definition and conceptual clarity. Once an account of different uses of the term 
‘knowledge’ and circumspect definitions is furnished, much of the putative basis for ‘contestation’ will 
have been eroded. By the time students have completed their undergraduate teacher training, many 
                                                 
5 The idea is that substantive conversation is needed in multicultural or intercultural contexts, where knowledge is 
seen as emanating from specific social and cultural histories rather than as ‘fixed’. From an inclusive education 
perspective Michel Foucault’s critique of epistemological hegemony and his analysis of how knowledge and truth are 
always part of systems of power are considered significant (Bekker; personal communication): 
Each society has its own regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse 
which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to 
distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying 
what counts as true. (Foucault, 1984: 73) 
At least two concerns arise in this regard. The ideas of ‘regimes of truth’ and ‘“general politics” of truth’ not only 
indicate a category mistake (in treating epistemological matters as necessarily inseparable from matters of social 
justice), but they are also dangerously close to relativism about truth. 
6 The most significant problems are posed by relativism (both about knowledge and about truth) and by the 
difficulty to distinguish between knowledge and mere belief, between science and non-science (especially dogma and 
superstition). 
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 have been thoroughly indoctrinated with constructivism. (On the purported significance and relevance of 
constructivist theory in today’s classrooms, see – for example – Delanty, 1997; Duffy and Cunningham 
1996; Potter, 1996; Richardson, 2003; Von Glasersfeld, 2000; Windschitl, 1999 and 2002.) It is generally 
assumed that it is only constructivism that provides a compelling account of active, student centered 
teaching and learning, and that rival pedagogies and learning theories err in significant respects. 
According to Duffy and Cunningham, and also Windschitl (Duffy and Cunningham, 1996; Windschitl, 
1999 and 2002), one of the most difficult underpinnings of constructivism for educators to embrace is 
that there are no universal truths and that constructivism by its very nature is not compatible with 
more objective forms of knowing. No wonder, one might respond – since this can only be apprehended as 
a ‘universal truth’ itself, or in terms of an ‘objective form of knowing’, respectively. It would appear 
then that in an important respect constructivism is self-undermining: either there are no universal truths 
(or objective forms of knowing), except this particular one; or the statement in question does not itself 
constitute a universal truth, or objective form of knowing.  
There is clearly a grain of truth in constructivism. Some facts are socially constructed, the results of 
human description and designation – like pass grades in tests or exams, codes of ethics, laws, speed 
limits, standards of etiquette, culinary recipes, and so on: contingent facts that emanate from our social 
practices. Constructivism errs, however, in saying that all facts, including historical and scientific facts, 
are human constructs. As a pedagogy, I suggest, constructivism has two major, related shortcomings. It 
degrades a fundamental educational task – that of transmission of knowledge. Furthermore, like 
postmodernism, constructivism is not only misleading but also potentially dangerous, in that it gives 
people (educators as well as learners) a false sense of empowerment and authority. Contrary to what 
their advocates have contended, neither approach is emancipatory. In fact, both as a pedagogy and as a 
learning theory, constructivism is likely to be disturbingly disempowering. The failure of outcomes-based 
education in most parts of the world, with its devaluation of subject-based knowledge, knowledge 
developed in the past and of knowledge for its own sake, is testimony to the plausibility of this 
judgement.7 It should be noted that the logic of neither inclusion nor epistemological access requires 
adoption of a constructivist epistemology. 
Moreover, there is a tendency in the inclusive education literature to relate the ‘deficit way of 
understanding difference’ to ‘the ideology of individualism’8 (Walton and Bekker, 2013: 454): 
                                                 
7 This is not the place for a detailed critique of these approaches. My sketchy remarks here are unlikely to persuade 
anyone that constructivism, for example, should be rejected. They merely serve to underline my misgivings about 
bestowing special status in education on a theoretical orientation that is deeply problematic. As Lotz-Sisitka claims, 
‘education has a critical role to play in preparing children to live in the world’ (Lotz-Sisitka, 2009: 71; emphasis 
added). This arguably requires that those who so prepare children live there, too. Frankly, I cannot see 
constructivism making a substantial contribution to this preparation process.  
8 There has also been a lot of critique of research that explores individual experiences of disability. For example, 
Michael Oliver distinguishes between the individual and the social model of disability (Oliver, 1990; Oliver, 2004). 
He rejects the individual (or ‘medical’) approach because it locates the ‘problem’ in individual deficit and sees its 
causes as ‘stemming from the functional limitations of psychological losses which are assumed to arise from 
disability’ (Oliver, 1990: 3). It therefore, he claims, does not take into account the structural (economic, 
environmental and cultural) exclusions that people with disabilities face. The argument is that making disability a 
personal or individual tragedy, requiring individual intervention, obviates the need to consider disabling practices 
and attitudes in society (or the classroom) as a whole. Zach McCall and Thomas Skrtic (2009) contend that 
collective action against oppression is forestalled by a focus on individual ‘problems’. It is perhaps ironic that 
Oliver’s own approach is rather exclusive and judgemental. For example, he states that he does ‘not intend to 
engage with the disapproving analyses that have been offered from those outside the [Disability Studies] Movement 
or in other parts of the academy’ (Oliver, 2004:18). His point that ‘the cultural environment in which we all grow 
up usually sees impairment as unattractive and unwanted’ (p. 4) certainly deserves to be taken seriously. 
Nevertheless, while he may be correct in stating that ‘parents’ feelings towards, and treatment of, a child born with 
an impairment are dependent upon what they have learned about disability from the world around them’ (p. 4), the 
following conclusion appears to be counter-intuitive, to say the least: ‘people who acquire impairment later in life 
have already been immersed in the personal tragedy viewpoint and it is not therefore surprising that many of these 
individuals find it difficult to know how to respond in any other way’ (p. 5). So, to view impairment acquired later 
in life as a personal tragedy is mistaken? And the disabled who do so view their own condition are wrong? Oliver 
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 Individualism assumes that if children work hard enough and apply themselves they should be 
successful. This shifts the blame for lack of school success onto the individual child as either being 
‘unable’ to succeed given an inner deficit or ‘unwilling’ to succeed in terms of effort and 
application. (Ibid.) 
This characterisation of individualism seems to be mistaken. In fact, individualism by its very nature 
takes difference and individual capability seriously and disavows the deficit conception highlighted 
above. After all, disabled children (for example) do not constitute a faceless class: they are individuals, 
with varying needs and abilities.9 A relevant and legitimate target would, rather, be performativity in 
education, which seems to have the bureaucratic and pernicious streak correctly targeted above.   
Finally, providing a list of personal features or characteristics of educators who are capable of 
enabling epistemological access 10  does not yield an explanation of why what these educators are 
mediating is (ipso facto) epistemological access. The challenge, then, would be to match the virtues of 
the inclusive, responsive teacher and the different ways in which and levels (for example, of difficulty 
and complexity) at which she works with and presents knowledge, how she thinks about, orders and 
sequences the knowledge she teaches, and the ways in which she works with the knowledge of others.  
3    Epistemic Parentalism 
Assuming responsibility for one’s own beliefs is only one concern among many in epistemology. Another 
concerns responsibility for the beliefs of others, through teaching, selection and control. This involves 
what Alvin Goldman calls ‘epistemic paternalism’ (Goldman, 1992). It refers to the kind of knowledge, 
information or communication control that occurs in education and law and in various other kinds of 
social enterprises and relations. It means that certain kinds of information are often withheld or kept 
from people, for the benefit of the recipient of knowledge or information (for example, the learner). 
Goldman draws an analogy with parents who keep dangerous toys or other articles away from children, 
or who decide not to expose children to certain types of situation. A similar impulse, he says, is at work 
with shielding children, learners or people generally from certain facts or types of information. In what 
follows, I prefer to speak of ‘parentalism’ rather than ‘paternalism’. For many, the latter has generally 
derogatory associations. Not only is it usually assumed to involve taking care of others while limiting 
                                                                                                                                                        
seems to proceed by way of bald assertion here. In fact, there seems to be a false dichotomy at work in his binary 
distinction. Focusing exclusively on the social model of disability may entail losing sight of the individual who is so 
disabled. It is not a matter of locating the ‘problem’ of disability in the individual but rather of individual 
recognition, of nurturing a sense of belonging in the individual and making sure that s/he does indeed ‘belong’. 
Walton agrees that ‘inclusion has to be about an educational responsiveness to individuality’, but also thinks that 
‘when individual differences are made a major focus, teachers cannot imagine that they can teach more than one 
child at a time’ (Walton, personal communication). 
9 Nussbaum endorses law’s ‘focus on protecting what most urgently needs protection: the claim of stigmatised 
children to be seen, and educated, as individuals’ (Nussbaum, 2006: 210). Keith Lewin (2007: 34) claims, similarly, 
that  
characteristics of individual learners are important. Their dispositions, capabilities and agency affect 
motivation to learn, application to learning activities, and learning outcomes. The more child centred basic 
education is, the more important it will be to understand what learners bring to schools, and how school 
processes address learning needs that may take very different forms for different individuals. Sustained 
participation depends on realistic accommodations of learners characteristics. Older children in particular 
acquire individual agency which shapes demand, participation and the extent to which meaningful learning 
takes place. 
10 Educators ‘who demonstrate pedagogical sensitivity and tact’ ‘show empathy’ (i.e., they ‘try to understand the 
learner’s point of view’; they ‘have a positive view of others’ (i.e., they ‘demonstrate trust and confidence in the 
worth, ability and capacity for growth, development and learning of the learners’); they ‘have a positive view of self’ 
(i.e., they ‘see themselves as capable and have a quiet sense of confidence’); they demonstrate ‘authenticity’ (i.e., 
they ‘are genuine and real in their interactions with learners’); they ‘have a meaningful purpose and vision’ (i.e., 
they ‘are committed to helping all learners to reach their potential’); and they ‘are sensitive and perceptive of the 
needs of others’ (Bekker, 2013: 477). 
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 their freedom and responsibility, but it also suggests a social order in which the father is the bearer of 
formal authority within the family. (‘Maternalism’ might go some way towards correcting the explicit 
androcentrism here, in its acknowledgement of informal, crucial and usually invisible familial authority, 
but it has a similarly gender-specific connotation.)  
Goldman begins by saying that the so-called ‘requirement of total evidence’ (p. 209) may be 
unacceptable. ‘Adequate evidence’ concerns the amount of evidence or justification required for 
knowledge. One of the chief foci in epistemology is on the person who makes knowledge-claims – be it an 
educator or a learner – who tries to collect as much evidence as possible. Evidence is necessary to ensure 
the ‘grounding’ of our beliefs. Yet, Goldman’s concern is to show that there may be reasons for doubting 
the desirability of the ‘requirement of total evidence’. 
Usefully for present purposes, Goldman chooses to illustrate epistemic parentalism with examples 
from the realm of education. In particular, he mentions curriculum selection. Curricular materials are 
selected by school personnel at various levels; not only by educators, but also by boards of education 
and principals. What is involved in curriculum selection? Epistemic parentalism is concerned not only 
with the relevance, suitability and verity of what is taught but also with the level of cognitive and 
emotional ability and maturity of the learners. Most pertinent to this discussion, learners are not 
exposed to all possible views or ideas on a given subject. Not only are they generally exposed only to 
materials that are relevant and appropriate to their level of understanding, but opinions that are 
regarded as false or indefensible are also withheld by current educational authorities. 
Goldman cites the example of teaching creationism in biology or other science classes. The argument 
he considers is that experts on science should be allowed to decide that creationism is, unlike the theory 
of evolution, not a serious contender in terms of scientific theory and should not be taught in science 
classes. Parents and learners are, generally, not the kinds of authority who need to be consulted in this 
regard: that is, with respect to promotion of truth and avoidance of error.  
Wondering about the need for parentalistically motivated epistemic constraints, Goldman asks 
whether epistemic parentalism is ‘really warranted’ (p. 214). A related question is, ‘Is epistemic 
[parentalism] desirable in terms of promoting truth and avoiding error?’ (pp. 214–215, 220) Logically 
speaking, epistemic parentalism is not necessary for education to occur. We could at least conceive of a 
situation where everything is taught indiscriminately, with little or no regard for its relevance, 
suitability and verity – a situation that nonetheless yields some kind of educational value. The more 
interesting question is whether epistemic parentalism is defensible – even desirable. The short answer 
seems to be, notwithstanding errors that are sometimes made in controlling knowledge and information, 
even with the best of intentions, that it should be practiced. Since none of us can reasonably hope to 
assess all evidence for all these personally, we often depend on the authority of others, so ‘epistemic 
[parentalism] is frequently necessary and sometimes epistemically desirable’ (p. 220). After all, it is 
practiced for the benefit of learners. This explains why a second kind of knowledge or information 
control, known as defensive teaching11, is undesirable: it occurs in the interest not of learners but, 
putatively, of educators themselves, or for reasons of safeguarding the status quo (as does indoctrination, 
for that matter).  
Goldman points out that epistemology has traditionally assumed that all those working with 
knowledge and justification have the same cognitive resources, skills and opportunities, and that they 
operate without time constraints and the like. This is an idealised setting, he contends, which is 
endorsed neither by common sense nor by common experience.  
[In] settings marked by different levels of expertise, by different opportunities for information 
gathering, by different levels of cognitive maturity and training, and by severe time constraints, 
                                                 
11 Lori McNeil (1986) refers to ‘fragmentation’, ‘mystification’ and ‘omission’ as strategies in defensive teaching, 
none of which benefit or are even meant to benefit learners. ‘Fragmentation’, refers to ‘the reduction of any topic to 
fragments or disjointed pieces of information’ (McNeil, 1986: 167), in other words to lists. ‘Mystification’ is a further 
example. ‘Teachers often [try] to surround a controversial or complex topic with mystery in order to close discussion 
of it’ (p. 169). When they mystify ‘a topic, they [make] it appear very important but unknowable’ (p. 169). This 
strategy, like that of ‘omission’ (which extends ‘beyond current topics to include … controversial sides of topics’, as 
well as viewpoints with which teachers disagree; p. 173), is frequently accompanied by a more or less explicit 
reference to students’ ignorance or lack of maturity, and to divulge any further information would be akin to 
‘casting pearls before swine’. 
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 idealized principles of communication do not apply. A social epistemology for the real world needs 
to take these constraints into account. (p. 224)  
This is especially pertinent with regard to learners living with various kinds of disability. Epistemic 
parentalism needs to take seriously the positions, perspectives and experiences of those who live with 
impairments in a society where impairment is not considered the norm but is seen, rather, as 
‘unattractive and unwanted’ (Oliver, 2004: 4). The trick of course, as Claudia Schumann (2016: 7) 
points out, is not to replace  
the rightfully criticized “view from nowhere” of a supposedly neutral epistemic subject with the 
equally uninhabitable “view from everywhere” of infinitely differentially embodied, situated, and 
interested knowers. Insofar as the infinite internally differentiated perspectives are all placed on 
equal par with each other, we run the danger of not having any criterion available to judge the 
validity of knowledge claims raised from any single perspective. 
This may help explain why parentalism remains epistemically warranted. A defensible parentalism 
that takes on the epistemic positions of the impaired will be likely to reflect a more accurate picture of 
social reality than an approach that assumes an idealised setting, in Goldman’s sense. I next turn to the 
idea of epistemic justice. 
4    Epistemic Justice 
Broadly, epistemic justice refers to the fair and equal distribution of epistemic benefits and burdens: it 
involves due acknowledgement of individuals as knowers with corresponding rights and obligations. In 
her influential account of epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker distinguishes between two types of 
epistemic justice, testimonial and hermeneutical justice. Fricker refers to them as hybrid virtues (in that 
they both have an intellectual and an ethical component) that serve to countervail or prevent epistemic 
(i.e., respectively, testimonial and hermeneutical) injustice. ‘Epistemic injustice’, Fricker argues, ‘is a 
distinct kind of injustice’. She distinguishes between two kinds, ‘testimonial injustice’ and 
‘hermeneutical injustice’, each of which consists, ‘most fundamentally, in a wrong done to someone 
specifically in their capacity as a knower’ (Fricker, 2007: 1; see also p. 21).  
Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility 
to a speaker’s word; hermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior stage, when a gap in collective 
interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of 
their social experiences. (p. 1) 
Central to her analysis is the notion of (social) ‘power’, which Fricker defines as ‘a socially situated 
capacity to control others’ actions’ (p. 4; see also p. 13). Power works ‘to create or preserve a given 
social order’, and is displayed in various forms of enablement, on the one hand, and disbelief, 
misinterpretation and silencing, on the other. It involves the conferral on certain individuals or groups, 
qua persons of that kind, ‘a credibility excess’ or ‘a credibility deficit’ (p. 21). The primary 
characterisation of testimonial injustice, according to Fricker, ‘remains such that it is a matter of 
credibility deficit and not credibility excess’ (ibid.). This is certainly plausible, although we can think of 
instances where credibility excess is disadvantageous: an overburdened teacher or lecturer being asked 
questions by his students that call for a more specialist training. Similarly, promoting someone to a 
position (e.g. through affirmative action) for which they are not equipped, simply to rectify past wrongs, 
may be argued to involve epistemic harm. 
Fricker’s interest resides specifically with ‘identity power’ and the harms it produces through the 
manifestation of ‘identity prejudices’. The latter are responsible for denying credibility to, or 
withholding it from, certain persons on the basis of their being members of a certain ‘social type’ (ibid.). 
Thus, testimonial injustice involves rejecting the credibility of their knowledge claims, while 
hermeneutical injustice involves a general failure of marshalling the conceptual resources necessary for 
understanding and interpreting these knowledge claims. The result is that these people are hindered in 
their self-development and in their attainment of full human worth: they are ‘prevented from becoming 
who they are’ (p. 5). In white patriarchal societies, these ‘epistemic humiliations’ (p. 51)12 carry the 
power to destroy a would-be (black or female) knower’s confidence to engage in the trustful 
                                                 
12 Fricker borrows the notion of epistemic humiliation from Simone de Beauvoir. 
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 conversations (pp. 52-53) that characterise well-functioning epistemic communities. As Fricker suggests, 
they can ‘inhibit the very formation of self’ (p. 55). Although they are experienced (and may be 
performed) individually, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice constitute not only individual harms: 
they originate within a social fabric of which the biases and prejudices that enliven and perpetuate them 
are a characteristic part. Contesting such injustices and harms, according to Fricker, requires ‘collective 
social political change’ (p. 8).  
In order to bring about such change, what is required at a testimonial level is ‘reflexive awareness of 
the likely presence of prejudice’, and this ‘anti-prejudicial virtue is the virtue of testimonial justice’ (pp. 
91-92). Testimonial justice, says Fricker, is ‘both ethical and intellectual in character, at once a virtue of 
truth and a virtue of justice’ (p. 124). Thus, apart from being able to rely on the competence and 
sincerity of speakers (p. 72), and apart from sensitivity (p. 72) and empathy (p. 79), ‘hearers need 
dispositions that lead them reliably to accept truths and to reject falsehoods’ (p. 115). However,  
there is no guarantee that epistemic and ethical ends will harmonize. If some down-trodden 
schoolteacher is told in no uncertain terms by the unscrupulous head teacher that when the 
school inspector visits the classroom, he must ask the pupils a question and make sure that he 
picks from among the sea of raised hands someone who will come out with the right answer. This 
epistemic aim might be best served by a policy that is not remotely just. It might be best served, 
for instance by picking a pupil who, notoriously, always gets her big brother to text her the 
answers on her mobile. (p. 126) 
‘Hermeneutical justice, like testimonial justice, is a hybrid virtue’ (p. 174), says Fricker. What it is 
meant to counteract is hermeneutical injustice – which occurs when (members of certain) groups or 
communities lack the hermeneutical tools to make sense of their own social experience (p. 146). ‘For 
something to be an injustice, it must be harmful but also wrongful, whether because discriminatory or 
because otherwise unfair’ (p. 151). When there is unequal ‘hermeneutical participation with respect to 
some significant areas(s) of social experience, members of the disadvantaged group are hermeneutically 
marginalised’ (p. 153). Fricker’s account, of course, raises the question whether there could be 
hermeneutical self-marginalisation. Fricker appears to deny this: 
Hermeneutical marginalisation is always socially coerced. If you simply opt out of full 
participation in hermeneutical processes as a matter of choice …, then you do not count as 
hermeneutically marginalised – you’ve opted out, but you could have opted in. Hermeneutical 
marginalisation is always a form of powerlessness, whether structural or one-off. (p. 153) 
Yes, one might respond, but one can be responsible for one’s powerlessness. It would seem to follow that 
hermeneutical injustice and hermeneutical marginalisation are not identical, insofar as the latter can be 
seen to include self-marginalisation. 
Louise Antony suggests the adoption of ‘epistemic affirmative action’ by men as a ‘working hypothesis 
that when a woman, or any member of a stereotyped group, says something anomalous, they should 
assume that it’s they who do not understand, not that it is the woman that is nuts’ (Antony, 1995: 89; 
quoted in Fricker, 2007: 171). By contrast, Fricker does not believe a policy of epistemic affirmative 
action across all subject matters to be justified: ‘the best way to honour the compensatory idea is in the 
form of a capacity for indefinitely context-sensitive judgement – in the form … of a virtue’ (Fricker, 2007: 
171). At what point, then, can a white man judge a woman, or any member of a stereotyped group, to 
be ‘nuts’ – if ever? Does epistemic justice require me, as a matter of course, to reserve judgement, to 
keep ‘an open mind as to credibility’ (p. 172)? As I have indicated above, if ‘credibility deficit’ is a 
matter of epistemic injustice, then why should ‘credibility excess’ (giving previously ‘epistemologically 
humiliated’ people or groups lots of credibility) not also constitute epistemic harm? More fundamentally, 
surely there is a difference between criticising someone’s view on the mere grounds that she is black, or 
a woman, and criticising the views held or expressed by someone, who happens to be black or a woman, 
on the grounds of faulty or fallacious reasoning. Nonsense is not culturally, racially or sexually specific. 
Indeed, although she gestures in the direction of a basic ‘do no harm’ principle (p. 85), Fricker herself 
insists that a ‘“vulgar” relativist’ resistance to passing moral judgment on other cultures ‘is incoherent’ 
(p. 106). 
Given how prejudice affects various levels of credibility, this discussion raises the question whether 
the idea of epistemic (in-)justice (which, after all, in Fricker’s analysis refers to the epistemic situation 
of women and blacks in a world dominated by men and whites) is at all relevant to inclusion of those 
with impairments. (That it is relevant to the situation of foreign nationals is surely not in doubt.) 
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 Testimonial justice appears as an original virtue of both justice and truth. Applied to the case of 
inclusion, it expresses the idea that the influence of a possible identity prejudice (in this case, against a 
person with cognitive disability or impairment) on the part of the (non-impaired) hearer has been 
recognised and corrected. Hermeneutical justice manifests itself in the reflective-critical sensitivity of the 
(non-impaired) hearer to any reduced understanding (or any failure to comprehend) incurred by the 
speaker (in this case, the person with cognitive disability) because of a gap in the collective 
hermeneutical resources. In other words, the hearer is aware of the fact that the speaker’s apparent lack 
of understanding is ‘a function of a collective hermeneutical impoverishment, and he adjusts or suspends 
his credibility judgement accordingly’ (Fricker, 2007: 7). 
To take a relevant example of hermeneutical injustice suggested by Emily Robertson: having long 
been excluded from the development of an available framework for articulating their experience, 
‘recently people with intellectual disabilities have rejected the term “retarded” as a slur although the 
field of “mental retardation” has used it for years’ (Robertson, 2013: 302). This indicates, Robertson 
asserts, that inclusion of the experiences and perspectives of marginalised groups in knowledge 
production can change the conceptual landscape in epistemically fruitful ways’ (ibid.). 
5    Further Questions and Concluding Thoughts 
This article has been concerned in the main with certain epistemological considerations pertaining 
inclusive education. What possibilities for learning and the acquisition of knowledge exist for those with 
cognitive and physical impairments? Access to institutions of learning is not identical to epistemological 
access. An additional consideration is that learning possibilities, as well as the mediation and acquisition 
of knowledge, differ from person to person. Given that no-one can participate or be included everywhere 
or claim unlimited access for oneself, should one nonetheless be able to determine to what one has access? 
While perhaps desirable this is clearly utopian. Especially in cases of limited autonomy and self-
determination a certain knowledge and information control is arguably both necessary and justified. In 
other words, the young and the cognitively impaired are not given unlimited access to knowledge and 
information. (Nor are any of us, for that matter, under any and all circumstances.)  
The controlled transfer of knowledge and information raises the question of epistemic justice. How 
ought one to accommodate the knowledge claims and the epistemic and cognitive abilities of those with 
relevant impairments? Under what circumstances can one speak of knowledge here? What would be the 
basis for inclusion within a knowledge community? Without being able to provide a comprehensive 
analysis here, I suggest that a context-sensitive realism offers plausible responses to these questions. It is 
concerned with a normative account: it deals with processes that ought or ought not to be called 
‘knowledge’ (Horsthemke, 2013). In other words, ‘knowledge’ is not ambiguous between various concepts 
of knowledge. What constitutes knowledge does not fluctuate with differences in people’s cognitive 
abilities or with what their constructs, ‘regimes’ or ‘politics’ are. It does acknowledge that people do not 
have the same cognitive resources, abilities and opportunities. They do not all act or operate in the 
absence of time constraints. Their situations are characterised by different levels of expertise, by 
different opportunities to access and gather information, by different levels of cognitive ability, maturity 
and training, and by considerable disparities in time constraints. This insight permits us to talk of 
different levels of knowledge, without implying relativism. It is not the case that ‘anything goes’, 
epistemologically. The knowledge in question remains characterised by the pursuit of truth and the 
avoidance of error. A relevantly disabled person’s claim constitutes ‘knowledge’ only if it is true. The 
same – obviously – goes for the claims of those without pertinent disabilities. Truth does not vary 
according to particular individuals, social or ethnic groups, or different cultures. This explains why we, 
as educators, are more lenient in some cases than in others, but our leniency does not extend to 
condoning untruths or falsehoods. 
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